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Abstract 
 
This article uses a new data set on the incidence of financial participation in large publicly-
traded firms in six European Union countries (Netherlands, France, UK, Finland, Spain, 
and Germany) to evaluate the possible complementarities between participatory practices. 
We find evidence that broad-based profit-sharing schemes are related to both direct and 
indirect participation, but we do not find this for broad-based equity schemes. In fact, 
broad-based equity schemes are negatively related to indirect participation.  Stock option 
plans appear to be negatively related to all forms of employee participation. Overall, the 
paper shows that the various forms of financial participation have very different 
relationships with other forms of employee involvement and participation.   
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1 Introduction 
The relationship between financial participation and other forms of employee 
participation have emerged as major issues for European Union institutions, Social 
Partners, and member governments.i  A recent Communication from the European 
Commission notes that the benefits of financial participation seem to be greatest when 
such schemes are introduced through a partnership approach and when they are 
embedded in an overall approach of participative management (CEC 2002: 19).  It 
further suggested that employees and their representatives should be informed and 
consulted about the details of financial participation schemes prior to their 
introduction (ibid: 12).  There is now a reasonable body of evidence that is supportive 
of these claims. Various articles reviewing the empirical evidence (Blinder 1990; 
Doucouliagos 1995; Jones et al 1997; Kruse and Blasi 1997; Poutsma 2001; Perotin 
and Robinson 2003) conclude that a complementarity between financial participation 
and other forms of participation have a beneficial impact on productivity and 
performance outcomes.  Furthermore, the ‘determinants’ literature has also observed a 
systematic co-existence of financial participation and direct forms of participation (eg. 
Festing et al 1999; McNabb and Whitfield 1998; Pendleton 1997).  However, 
evidence on linkages between indirect participation and financial participation is 
mixed, with some studies finding that financial participation is more prevalent in 
unionised environments (Gregg and Machin 1988; Pendleton 1997) and with some 
finding the opposite (Festing et al 1999) or that financial participation is less common 
in establishments covered by collective bargaining (Heywood et al 1997).   
 
 In this paper we explore further the relationships between financial 
participation and other forms of participation drawing on data collected from listed 
companies in Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. We 
provide evidence on several important questions. First, what is the incidence of 
financial participation in the listed company sector? Second, to what extent are other 
forms of participation related to financial participation? Does the presence of either 
direct or indirect participation predict the use of profit sharing and employee equity 
plans? Three, to what extent is employee participation in profit sharing and equity 
plans influenced by the presence of other forms of participation?  
 
 2
Our results challenge the view that financial participation and other forms of 
participation are complementary in the sense that the presence of one facilitates the 
use of the other.  Although there is some evidence of co-existence of profit sharing 
and other participatory practices, this conjunction is not found with employee equity 
plans. Neither the use of stock option plans nor stock allocation/acquisition plans are 
significantly related to either direct or indirect participation.  In so far as the evidence 
elsewhere suggests that complementarity between these forms of participation brings 
about superior company performance, our results imply that firms in our study may 
not be realising the full gains of financial participation.         
 
This paper adds to the extant literature in several ways.  First, we distinguish 
more precisely between types of equity plan than is common in many studies: stock 
option plans are distinguished from other share acquisition plans.  Second, we add to 
the typical analysis of determinants by focusing on employee participation rates as 
well as plan presence. Although participation rates are clearly highly influenced by 
company decisions about eligibility, participation in a plan will also be an employee-
level decision. Finally, we extend the analysis to countries that have not featured in 
financial participation research to date, such as Finland and Spain.  Overall, the most 
important contribution is the evidence that, across a range of countries, employee 
equity plans do not systematically co-exist with other forms of participation. .   
 
 
 
 
2 Review of the literature 
 
The topic of complementarities in the human resource management has received 
much attention in the recent economics of organisation and industrial relations 
literature.  A series of studies has emphasised the role of ‘bundles’ of HRM practices, 
including financial participation, in contributing to superior organisational 
performance.  Some studies have identified forms of financial participation as one 
practice amongst several that form part of bundles (for example, Ichniowski, Shaw 
and Prennushi (1997)) whilst others have focused on the relationship between 
financial participation and other forms of participation, e.g. Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) 
and Levine (1995).   
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There are several reasons why financial participation can be complementary to 
other forms of participation. Isolated financial participation schemes suffer from the 
free-rider effect: if employees care only about their personal pay-offs, then group-
based incentive schemes are likely to be ineffective in all but the smallest work 
environment, since there will always be a temptation to free-ride on other employees 
(Oyer 2002). However, other participatory schemes may help to create a corporate 
culture based on co-operation (Weitzman and Kruse 1990) or enhance mutual 
monitoring (Kandel and Lazear 1992), thereby ameliorating the free-rider problem. 
Looking at it from the other direction, financial incentives may enhance the 
effectiveness of work practices such as work teams that rely on the use of employees’ 
‘private’ information. The willingness of employees to disclose production-relevant 
information may be influenced positively by pay-offs provided by instruments such as 
financial participation (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; MacDuffie 1995).   
 
The potentially symbiotic relationship between financial participation and other 
forms of participation is expressed well by Levine and D’Andrea Tyson.  They note 
that,  
“sustained, effective participation (in decisions) requires that employees be 
rewarded for the extra effort which such participation entails, and that they 
receive a share of any increased productivity or profits…Just as participation 
can lead to demands for profit sharing, profit sharing can lead to demands for 
participation.  When there is profit sharing, workers’ incomes depend on the 
decisions of the firm, and workers want to have a say in these decisions” (1990: 
209).  
 
Further reasons for anticipating a complementarity between financial 
participation and other forms of participation include the following. One, financial 
participation plans typically require communication with employees (eg to meet 
securities regulations), such that firms with prior forms of participation will typically 
have lower set-up costs (cf Eaton and Voos 1992).  Two, a management that is 
already predisposed to employee participation appears more likely to respond 
positively to new forms of participation than a management that has no experience or 
record in this area.  Three, a perceived willingness of management to share 
information and control signals to employees that managerial motives are not 
opportunistic, whilst the presence of representative institutions may ensure that 
employees are not exposed to ‘hidden’ or excessive risk (see Levine 1995).  Thus, 
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financial participation may be more prevalent and more popular with employees 
where there are other forms of participation.   
 
Although much of the evidence suggests that financial participation is more 
likely to have beneficial impacts on performance when other forms of participation 
are present (Doucoliagos 1995; McNabb and Whitfield 1998; Perotin and Robinson 
2003), there is some recent counter-evidence (such as Addison and Belfield’s (2000) 
analysis of the 1998 UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey). The evidence on 
co-existence between the two, irrespective of performance outcomes is more evenly 
balanced. Huijgen and Poutsma (1999) found significant correlations between 
financial participation and direct participation in European countries included in the 
EPOC survey, and especially in France and the UK, the two countries with the highest 
incidence of financial participation.  However, Festing et al (1999), using data on 
France, Germany, Sweden and the UK in the CRANET survey, few relationships 
between direct participation and the presence of either profit sharing or share 
ownership, though job enlargement and flexibility were related to share plans in 
France and the UK, and to profit share plans in France.  
 
As for indirect participation, the extant European evidence is mixed and 
contradictory. Festing et al (1999) found strong inverse associations between union 
density and equity plans (except in France), and negative but insignificant 
relationships between density and profit sharing (except in the UK where it was 
strongly negative).  A later study for the European Foundation found weak 
relationships between union density and both profit sharing and equity plans though 
union density was significantly inversely related to narrow-based equity plans 
(Pendleton et al 2001).  These pan-European studies contrast with earlier country-
based studies, mainly in the UK, where union density has been positively associated 
with the use of equity plans, at least up to a point (Gregg and Machin 1988; Pendleton 
1997).  Meanwhile, evidence from Germany indicates that the presence of works 
councils is not significantly associated with use of profit sharing, except in those 
establishments which are covered by an industry-wide collective bargaining 
agreement (Heywood et al 1997).  Further afield, both US and Australian evidence 
finds weak relationships between profit sharing and union density (Kruse 1996; Drago 
and Heywood 1995).  
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 Several limitations can be observed in this literature. First, the type of 
financial participation is often not clearly distinguished. It is rare for equity-based 
plans to be separated into their constituent types. For instance, share option and other 
share acquisition plans are usually grouped together even though they have very 
different characteristics (the shape of employee risk differs considerably between 
options-based and other equity-based plans).  Furthermore, some studies (eg Festing 
et al 1999) do not clearly distinguish between broad-based and executive-only 
financial participation plans.  Second, it is uncommon for studies that investigate the 
relationships between financial participation and other forms of participation to 
include more than two or three measures of the latter (often because of 
multicollinearity between participation measures).  It is rare for studies to consider the 
impact of employee involvement in corporate governance on the presence of share 
plans, even though this form of involvement is potentially important in large listed 
firms in some European countries.  There is an obvious complementarity between 
employee share ownership (giving control rights) and involvement in corporate 
governance.  Three, with the exception of Drago and Heywood (1995), the influences 
on the extent of employee participation in financial participation plans has not been 
considered.  Yet, other forms of participation may be critical to high rates of 
employee participation for both administrative and  trust-based reasons.   
 
In this paper, therefore, we examine potential complementarities by exploring 
the relationship between various forms of participation and financial participation.  
Three forms of participation are discerned in addition to financial participation itself: 
representative participation, direct participation, and participation in the establishment 
and operation of financial participation.  We distinguish between profit sharing and 
equity plans, and, within the equity plan group, between share options and other forms 
of share acquisition.  The empirical strategy in the paper is to examine the relationship 
between the various forms of employee participation and both the presence of and 
participation rates in financial participation in listed firms with large market 
capitalisation.  The following questions are posed in the paper. 
 
1. What is the incidence of financial participation in these companies?  
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2. To what extent do the various forms of participation co-exist, and 
do the various forms of decision-making participation predict the 
use of financial participation? 
3. Does the presence of direct and/or indirect participation influence 
the level of employee participation in profit sharing and equity-
based plans? 
  
It will be evident that Questions 1 and 2 refer to decisions that are primarily 
made by companies and their managers, though these decisions may be influenced by 
prevailing patterns of employee representation and influence.  Question 3, by contrast, 
refers to some extent to employee-level decisions, though the parameters will be set 
by managerial decisions about eligibility.   
 
 The predicted answer to Question One is that financial participation will be 
most widespread in those countries where there has been the longest and greatest 
support for financial participation (see Pendleton et al 2002).  Thus, profit sharing will 
likely be most widespread in France, where one form of profit sharing has been 
compulsory for firms with more than 50 employees for some considerable time.  
Profit sharing is also expected to be widespread in Germany due to its integration with 
long-standing employee savings and wealth distribution instruments (Carstensen et al, 
1995), and possibly as an alternative to equity-based instruments (given the relatively 
small size of the German stock market).  Share ownership plans are expected to be 
most prevalent in the UK, where legislation to promote share plans has been in 
operation for twenty-five years.  The average age of financial participation plans is 
likely to reflect the longevity of legislation and fiscal concessions. Furthermore, we 
anticipate that many financial participation plans in countries other than France and 
the UK will be of very recent progeny.   
 
      As for Question Two, we predict that the presence of financial participation 
will be associated with the use of direct participation for the types of reasons 
considered earlier.  Complementarity between the two is likely to raise returns whilst 
lowering set-up costs.  Furthermore, the managerial decision to establish a financial 
participation plan may well reflect beliefs about the efficacy of employee involvement 
that will also lead to the use of forms of direct involvement.  Predicting the 
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relationship between financial participation and indirect participation is less clear-cut.  
On the one hand, a complementarity may be expected for the same reasons as 
proposed in relation to direct participation.  On the other, suspicion of financial 
participation by some employee representatives where representation is present may 
constrain managerial capacities to use financial participation. Alternatively, those 
firms where representation is absent may be run by owners and managers who are 
well-disposed to financial participation.  In other words, absence of representation and 
support for financial participation may flow from a common managerial ideology that 
emphasises common interests.  These observation raise a more general issue as to 
whether financial participation might be a substitute for other forms of participation, 
and vice-versa.  It is arguable that some countries have made relatively less use of 
financial participation than others because they have developed alternative means of 
securing employee consent and commitment.  If a country has a well-developed 
works council system, for instance, does it need employee equity plans?             
 
It is difficult to provide a clear prediction for Question Three.  On the one 
hand, participation rates could be positively associated with indirect representation 
such as trade union committees because these forms of representative participation 
provide protection (real and perceived) against risk and managerial opportunism. The 
relationship is likely to be stronger in the case of share purchase plans than share 
options because the level of risk to employees is more immediate. On the other hand, 
participation rates in equity plans may be negatively associated with indirect 
participation because these plans are likely to be a more central feature of companies 
without ‘traditional’ forms of employee representation, with the result that employees 
are more likely to subscribe in such companies. Or, given risk aversion amongst 
employees, employees in high indirect participation firms may use their decision-
making power to limit the use of these plans.  Direct participation is likely to be 
positively associated with share ownership participation (both options and share 
purchase plans) because provision of employee involvement will encourage a high-
trust work environment that will be conducive to employee subscription to the share 
plan.  Employee involvement in the design, introduction, and administration of share 
plans may positively influence employee participation in the share plan because of 
protection against managerial opportunism. 
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3. Data 
To address these questions we utilise a dataset collected from a sample of publicly 
traded firms in six European Union member countries: Finland, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. These countries represent the main geographical 
areas of the European Union. They also provide examples of countries where the use 
of financial participation has been longstanding (France, UK), where it has become 
more popular recently (Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands), or where the use 
remains low (Spain).  We concentrate on listed firms because previous work has 
indicated that listing is a very powerful influence on the incidence of share-based 
financial participation (Pendleton et al 2001).       
  
The sampling frame was 869 stock-market listed firms (see Table 1). For the 
two smaller lists, Helsinki and Amsterdam, we contacted all companies in the stock 
exchange. In other countries, the sample was drawn from the largest 200 companies 
by market capitalisation. In the UK, the sampling frame was the FTSE 100 in its 
entirety plus a random sample of firms within the main market sectors (except 
investment companies) in the FTSE 350. In Germany the listed companies from the 
prime standard are contacted (except investment companies). In France the top 100 
companies were selected (CAC40 plus a selection). In Spain the top 100 of BME 
were selected (Barcelona and Madrid). In all cases the contact details of the person 
responsible for financial participation or the HRM manager are gathered. In some 
cases we were not able or allowed to gather this information. This led to a slightly 
lower number of potential respondents. This approach leads to some over-
representation of Finland and the Netherlands in the final dataset. France and Spain is 
under-represented.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Information was collected using a structured questionnaire sent to the person 
responsible for managing financial participation or to a senior human resource 
manager responsible for employee rewards. The questionnaire was designed to collect 
information on financial participation plans and other forms of employee 
participation.  The study focuses on national financial participation plans, and we did 
not include questions on global equity plans.  Information was collected on both 
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consultative and delegative forms of participation (see Huijgen and Poutsma 1999) as 
well as on indirect participation and employee involvement in governance. 
Information on union density was not sought because this measure (of union presence 
or power) does not have uniform implications between countries due to variations in 
institutional contexts ii.  
 
The response rate overall was 29.5 per cent, with the lowest national rate 
being 18 per cent in Spain, and the highest levels in the Netherlands and in the UK.  
The data may suffer from selection bias in so far as firms with financial participation 
may be disproportionately likely to respond. Given the lack of comprehensive 
national statistics of the incidence of financial participation in some countries this 
cannot be ruled out. However, at some points our data also understates the real 
incidence of schemes. For instance, it is known that in Finland over 75 per cent of 
publicly listed firms have stock option schemes (Jones, Kalmi and Mäkinen 2004), 
while our data suggests that only 55 per cent of firms have stock option plans. Apart 
from potential sampling error, it may be that some Finnish firms that have only 
managerial schemes have not indicated their scheme in their response, and the same 
has probably happened in other countries as well.  With these cautions about the 
degree of representativeness of the respondents, we believe that the data gives a good 
picture of participation practices in the upper reaches of the listed company sector in 
each country.   
 
4 Results:  
i) the incidence of financial participation 
 
As is shown in Table 2, a financial participation plan is found in over 80 per cent of 
listed companies in all countries, except Spain where the figure is just over 40 per 
cent. Share schemes are more common than profit-sharing schemes: almost 70 per 
cent of respondents have an equity scheme, while slightly over 50 per cent of 
respondents have a profit-sharing scheme. Stock option plans are widespread, with 
over 60 per cent of respondents having such a plan.  This does not mean that the use 
of other share plans, such as stock purchase arrangements, is confined to the residual 
between all schemes and stock option schemes. Most respondents with equity 
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schemes have more than one scheme. 122 respondents have an equity scheme other 
than stock options, but of these 101 appear together with stock options (not shown in 
the table). Over 85 per cent of respondents have either an equity scheme or a profit-
sharing scheme.  
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The above notwithstanding, broad-based profit-sharing schemes are slightly 
more common than broad-based equity schemes. This is because profit-sharing 
schemes are almost always broad-based, while a significant proportion (around one-
third) of equity schemes are not. As predicted, the highest incidence of broad-based 
profit sharing is found in France, where legislation to promote this form of financial 
participation is long-standing.  Apart from Spain, the incidence of broad-based profit 
sharing is similar between countries, ranging from just under 40 per cent to 50 per 
cent.  The results for broad-based share plans also fit with institutional explanations: 
share plans are most prevalent in the UK, where there has been long-standing 
legislation to promote this form of financial participation.  The UK also has the 
highest incidence of stock options plans, though not all of these are broad-based      
 
As for the number of schemes per country, here the two leading countries are 
the UK and France. In both countries, the average listed firm has over 2 schemes. 
However, this may be partly due to national characteristics of the schemes. For 
instance, if profit-shares are partly distributed as shares, the plan may be counted 
twice. We are able to check this in most cases and can confirm that the same reward is 
not double-counted.  However, we cannot be sure that this is so in every case so 
double-counting cannot be entirely ruled out.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 contrasts sharing plans according to average age by country, and as 
can be seen there are substantial differences.. Profit sharing schemes tend to be older 
than equity plans, with the oldest profit share programme being over 100 years old 
and about a quarter of them being over 20 years old. They are a more recent 
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phenomenon in Finland, where they became common only during the 1990s, and in 
Spain, where they are rare. As for equity plans, they tend to be long-standing in 
France, Germany and the UK, whilst they are younger in in Finland and in the 
Netherlands.  Within the equity plan grouping, stock option plans are mainly of recent 
progeny, except in the case of the UK and France.  Stock options plans became more 
common from the late 1990s in some European countries, such as Germany (where 
the KonTrac legislation in 1998 removed legal constraints) and Finland.  It is notable 
that 60 per cent of the German firms have stock options: this indicates very rapid 
growth since legalisation. 
 
 
ii) The relationship between forms of participation and financial participation 
In the next stage of the analysis, the focus is on the relationship of direct and 
indirect participation with financial participation. Specifically, the intention is to 
determine to what extent forms of participation predict the use of financial 
participation.  Altogether, seven forms of participation are considered in addition to 
financial participation, and these were selected to reflect indirect and direct 
participation.  Indirect participation items are the presence within the firm of a trade 
union committee, a works council or joint consultative committee, and employee 
representation on the company board.  Direct items are employee surveys, suggestion 
schemes, quality circles, and teamwork.  The means of these variables, and the 
correlations between them, are shown in Table 4.    
 
Table 4 about here. 
 
 Table 4 provides support to the idea that the various participatory practices 
are complements. Of the 21 pairwise correlation coefficients, 16 are positive and 
significant, and 5 are insignificant. There are no significant negative correlations. This 
indicates a high degree of correlation between variables. Furthermore, the within-
groups correlations (ie within the direct and indirect participation ‘groups’) are 
stronger than between-groups correlation. This can be seen most clearly in relation to 
works councils: these are strongly correlated with union committees and board 
representation, but only weakly or not at all with direct participation. In contrast, 
board representation correlates strongly with all other variables except for teams. 
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Teams have zero correlations with indirect participation but they are strongly 
correlated with other direct participation practices. The highest correlation coefficient 
is between quality circles and suggestion schemes (r =  0.49).  
 
Given the extent of correlation between the participation variables, the issue 
arises as to how to deal with these in multivariate analysis. Four possible ways can be 
considered, each with strengths and weaknesses. The first is to enter each 
participatory variable into a regression equation separately so that we can assess the 
individual effects of each. However, there are major drawbacks. Entering the 
variables individually does not reveal anything about complementarities (or 
interactions) between variables.  Use of interaction terms to overcome this problem is 
precluded by the difficulties of interpretation when several such terms would need to 
be included.  A further major problem is the likely extent of multicollinearity given 
that some participatory practices appear to co-exist.  
 
 Another possibility is to bundle the participatory practices using some ideal 
types of participation, e.g. high involvement, collective bargaining, and authoritarian 
workplaces (see e.g. Fernie and Metcalf 1995). However, such categorisations, while 
arguably based on theory, often have an ad hoc – flavour. Moreover, the fact that we 
have data on six countries with very different industrial relations systems makes it 
very difficult to find categories that could be equally applicable to each individual 
country.  A third possibility is to use summated scale indices (as in MacDuffie 1995). 
While this has the virtue of simplicity, it suffers from assigning, somewhat arbitrarily, 
an equal weight to each practice.  We present such scales and information on the 
incidence of participatory practices by country in Appendix One but do not use these 
indices in the regressions because of this limitation.      
  
A fourth possibility – and the one we adopt – is to use principal components 
analysis (PCA). PCA is a statistical technique that linearly transforms a set of 
variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables, whilst retaining the information 
incorporated in the original variables (e.g. Dunteman 1988). It is the most robust 
statistically of these four options, and for this reason has been used elsewhere in the 
high performance work practice literature (eg Huselid 1995).  It has some particular 
advantages for our purpose.  Of the four approaches, the notion of complementarity is 
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most easily incorporated in the PCA approach. An initial test for complementarity is 
whether the variables load positively onto the first principal component (Laursen and 
Foss 2003). Second, the PCA also enables us to examine whether the conceptual 
distinction between indirect and direct forms of participation also holds empirically, 
and whether certain practices are complementary or substitutes. While most of the 
literature cited above implies that various participatory practices are complementary, 
a plausible alternative hypothesis that they are substitutes could also be formulated. 
For instance, does employee board representation reduce the need for unionisation, 
since employees interests are already represented (in which case board representation 
and unions are substitutes), or does effective board representation require union 
support to be effective (complements)?  
  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 shows the loadings of the various principal components. All variables 
load positively to the first component, quality circles and suggestion schemes getting 
the highest loadings. This supports the view that there are complementarities between 
various forms of participation, and the first component can also be interpreted as an 
indicator of “general participation”.  In the second component, the indirect forms of 
participation load positively while the direct forms of participation load negatively. 
This component can be interpreted as a contrast between indirect and direct 
participation. We choose to retain the two first components that capture around 50 per 
cent of the total variance. While retaining the two first components is consistent with 
the “Kaiser criterion” that recommends dropping those components that have 
eigenvalues less than one (Dunteman 1988, p. 22), these two components are also the 
easiest to interpret given the distinction between direct and indirect participation, and 
the role of complementarities, in our prior conceptual framework.  The regression 
values of these factors are computed and then used in the probit analyses. 
 
To evaluate the role of participation, we mount probit estimations of the 
determinants of various forms of financial participation, with these factor scores being 
included as independent variables. We also include several control variables.  The 
natural log of employment is the measure of firm size.  It should be noted that 
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although the sample basis was size by market capitalisation, the inclusion of high 
value smaller firms (eg bio-technology firms) means that there is greater variation in 
employment size than might be expected (mean = 13654, standard deviation = 
27,541)iii.   Employment size is expected to have two contradictory effects. On the 
one hand, economies of scale in scheme set-up and administration suggest a positive 
relationship. One other hand, the free-rider effect suggests a negative relationship 
between employment size and financial participation.  A related argument is that the 
“team spirit” or effective communication channels that may be necessary 
complements for the effective use of sharing plans are more readily cultivated in 
smaller firms (Weitzman and Kruse 1990; Ben-Ner et al. 2000).  Since our data 
consists entirely of listed firms that would be expected to have expertise in accounting 
and personnel management (in response to regulatory pressures), we anticipate that 
the free rider issues might predominate, thereby leading to a negative relationship 
between size and plan presence.   
 
We also control for the relationship between different forms of financial 
participation. There is evidence from Japan and from the US that firms may operate 
more than one type of financial participation scheme simultaneously (Jones and Kato 
1995; Freeman and Dube 2001). It is worth noting that while profit-sharing and equity 
schemes are often lumped together as “financial participation”, they may operate to a 
quite different logic. Profit-sharing is based on accounting figures and thus reflects 
past performance. The returns to equity schemes, in turn, depend on share price 
performance and reflect expectations on future performance. In our data, the co-
existence of profit-share and equity plans sometimes results from the fact that profit-
shares are paid at least partly in equity: this is the case especially in France and in the 
UK. As noted earlier, we cannot fully distinguish between cases where equity awards 
are part of a profit sharing plan and cases where the two schemes operate separately. 
However, this shortcoming is not critical because the decision to pay out profit shares 
in equity indicates more ‘advanced’ financial participation than where profit shares 
are paid in cash (though possibly in deferred form, as in France)iv  
 
Finally, dummies are included for each country in our analysis (UK being the 
omitted category), for information and communication technologies (ICT) firms, and 
for services (manufacturing being the omitted category). Our expectations related to 
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country dummies are based on previous cross-European research, as well as the 
results presented earlier, that has suggested that broad-based schemes are common 
especially in France, with its mandatory profit-sharing, and in the UK, where share 
schemes are common (Pendleton et al. 2001, Poutsma and de Nijs 2003). We expect 
equity schemes to be most common in ICT, where stock options especially are known 
to be widely used (Ittner, Lambert and Larcker 2003) because (young) employees are 
assumed to be risk-positive, there is a pronounced need to lock-in unique human 
capital, and there are often liquidity problems for the firm.  Financial participation is 
predicted to be more prevalent in services rather than manufacturing environments 
due to the nature of work tasks (eg. less easily measured) and the nature of the 
workforce.  
 
We use two complementary approaches in our investigation on the financial 
participation schemes. First, we use probit to examine whether the firm has a broad-
based profit-sharing or equity plan, using the 50 per cent participation rate as a cut-
off. Second, we use OLS regressions to examine employee participation rates. We 
include into the second set of regressions additional variables based on information 
that applies only to firms with financial participation.  These are employee 
participation in the design of the scheme, and the relative performance of the firm 
upon the adoption of the scheme. In the specification containing equity schemes, we 
also add dummy variables for the availability of tax reliefs. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the probit analysis. We estimate separately the 
probabilities of having broad-based profit-sharing and broad-based equity schemes.v 
The criterion for “broad-based” is a positive response to a question asking whether 
plans are broad-based, supplemented with a 50 per cent or higher participation rate. 
The effects reported in the table are the probit marginal effects, which denote the 
expected increase in the probability (measured in the percentage units) that the firm 
has a broad-based scheme, when the relevant dependent variable changes by one unit 
(and all other variables are held constant). We calculate the expected probability by 
holding all variables, expect for the number of employees, at zero.vi Thus, the 
reference firm is a UK manufacturing firm with average participation and without a 
 16
broad-based equity scheme. For such a firm, the expected probability of observing a  
broad-based profit sharing plan is 35.5per cent. If the firm happened to be French (i.e. 
the dummy French would obtain the value 1) the expected probability increases by 55 
percentage units. In contrast, if the firm were Spanish, the expected probability 
decreases by 30 percentage units.  
 
However, the more interesting results relate to other variables. The 
simultaneous presence of a broad-based equity plan increases the likelihood of 
observing a broad-based profit-sharing plan by 12 percentage units.  There are 
significant effects from the participation variables as well. A one standard deviation 
unit increase in general participation increases the probability by 5 percentage units, 
and a corresponding increase in the second component also increases the probability 
by 5 percentage units (though the latter is not quite significant at 10 per cent). The 
interpretation of these results is that there is indeed evidence on complementarities, 
that the use of broad-based profit-sharing increases with the use of other participatory 
practices, and that this increase is more strongly related with the use of indirect 
participation practices than direct participation practices. These results are consistent 
with the descriptive results found in Appendix One, where participation indices get 
higher values in firms with profit-sharing schemes than in those that did not have 
profit-sharing, and where the differences were more pronounced for indirect  than 
direct participation.vii  
 
A further significant result in Table 6 relates to the number of employees. A 
unit increase in the log of employment (which corresponds to a 170 per cent increase 
in ordinary scale) increases the probability of observing a broad-based profit-sharing 
scheme by over 5 per cent.viii This indicates that larger firms are more likely to adopt 
profit-sharing plans. In contrast, the industry dummies are not significant. 
 
Turning to the determinants of broad-based equity plans, we see that the 
country dummies get negative values and three of them (Netherlands, Finland and 
Spain) are significant. Broad-based equity plans are clearly more common in the UK 
than in other countries. The presence of a broad-based profit share plan also increases 
the likelihood of observing a broad-based equity plan by 12.5per cent. The 
participation indices get negative signs, but both of them are insignificant. The use of 
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equity plans thus seems to be independent of other forms of participation. ICT firms 
have a 20 percentage units higher probability of having a broad-based equity scheme 
than manufacturing firms, whilst the probability does not differ between service and 
manufacturing firms.. The effect of the number of employees is the reverse compared 
to the effect in profit-sharing firms: here a one log-unit increase in the number of 
employees decreases the probability of observing a broad-based equity scheme by 5 
percentage units.  
 
We also examine more specific forms of share plans: share acquisition and 
stock option plans.  We cannot clearly separate out firms with these two forms of 
share plans: a substantial number of share plan firms have both forms. Nevertheless, 
the results indicate some differences in predictors.  In the results for share acquisition 
plans, all of the country dummies become significant.  In combination with the 
significant effect of profit sharing, this suggests that the results are picking up the UK 
Approved Profit Sharing scheme (which allocates shares to employees, resourced by 
profits). By contrast, stock option plans operate independently of profit sharing and 
are strongly predicted by the ICT dummy and the size measures.  However, in both 
instances, the participation measures are not significant, and this reinforces the results 
for share plans as a whole. Also of note is that general participation is negatively 
related (though not significantly) to stock options.  
.  
To sum up the findings from the Table 6, it appears that profit-sharing is 
strongly related to participation, and to indirect participation more than direct 
participation. However, we do not find any links between equity schemes and 
participation in decision-making.  The country effects are also consistent with the 
results presented earlier, and reinforce the importance of national institutional and 
legislative contexts.  
 
iii) Employee participation in financial participation plans 
The final stage of the analysis is concerned with the determinants of employee 
participation rates in broad-based financial participation, and specifically whether 
other forms of employee participation have a positive effect on these. We anticipate 
positive effects on the grounds that these other forms of participation will add to a 
participatory culture and generate trust.  All things being equal, these considerations 
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should be more important for equity plans than for profit sharing because the former 
typically require employees to invest or at least to explicitly ‘opt-in’ to the plan 
(because of regulatory requirements).     
 
 Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for employee participation rates in the 
various forms of financial participation.  Average participation rates in profit sharing 
are above 75 per cent in all countries other than Spain, with the median rate being 100 
per cent or just under four of the six countries.  Clearly, nearly all profit sharing plans 
have very high participation rates.  By contrast, the average participation rate in share 
plans is much lower, with a mean in four countries of just over 50 per cent, and a 
median participation rate of a similar order.  Spain again has a lower participation 
rate, and France has a higher participation rate.   
 
Table 7 about here 
 
 In this part of the analysis we include additional independent variables. We 
control for the recent performance of the firm, on the grounds that higher performance 
is likely to stimulate higher participation, either because it may lead to larger profit 
share pay-outs or may boost the valuation of the listed company.  This is a reverse 
argument to the typical causal path in the literature which postulates that financial 
participation causes superior performanceix.  An alternative argument is that in equity 
plans, prudent employee investors will participate when performance is below par on 
the basis that substantial gains might be made. This is especially so for option plans 
where downside risk is minimised.  Past performance was measured on a three-point 
scale where 1 indicates lower than average performance, 2 is average performance, 
and 3 is above average performance upon adoption. Since very few respondents 
indicated that their performance was below average, the variable was recoded into a 
dummy with the value 1 if  performance was above average and 0 otherwise. 
 
We also include controls for the use of tax breaks for employees and 
employers, where 1 = the presence of a tax break, 0 otherwise. The expectation here is 
that tax breaks, especially those for employees, are positively linked with 
participation rates. 
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We expect that employee participation in the management of financial 
participation will positively affect employee participation rates because of the 
protection apparently provided against hidden risk and managerial opportunism. The 
variable used is a five-point scale measuring the extent of employee participation in 
the development of the financial participation plan. 
 
Since the dependent variable is a continuous measure (though truncated at 0 
and 100), ordinary least squares is used to assess the determinants of the employee 
participation rate, and the results are shown in Tables 8 and 9.  Two sets of 
specifications are shown: one where the independent variables are the same as those 
in stage two of the analysis (Table 8), and a second that incorporates the additional 
variables described above (Table 9).  The new variables included in Table 9 have a 
value only if a plan is present, so the number of observations in the regressions is 
lower than in Table 8.  A weakness of the OLS method in this context is that many 
observations are concentrated at the ends of the distribution, with the result that the 
standard errors may get overly large, thereby reducing the statistical significance of 
our findings. This is more of a problem with the profit-sharing equations because 
participation tends to be more or less uniformly high. Therefore, the results should be 
interpreted with care.x  A further limitation of this analysis is that we do not have any 
direct information on the characteristics of employees and that we have to use rather 
broad proxies (e.g. industry sector) to capture these.       
 
Tables 8 and 9 about here 
 
The results for the first specification are similar to those presented in Table 6.  
The France dummy increases the participation rate in broad-based profit-sharing, 
compared to the UK, by 55 percentage units, as is to be expected given compulsory 
all-employee profit sharing in France. A log-unit increase in the number of employees 
increases the participation rate by 4 per cent.  A standard deviation- unit increase in 
general participation increases the participation rate by around 5 percentage units. 
However, the impact of the contrast between indirect and direct participation is not 
significant. Also the impact of the participation rate in equity schemes remains 
insignificant. However, as discussed above, the inflation of standard errors due to the 
statistical problems discussed above may cause insignificance.  
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In column 5 (Table 9) we present the results for profit-sharing with the 
additional explanatory variables. In this model, general participation becomes 
insignificant, but the new variable recording employee participation in plan 
management is strongly significant.  The direction of causality is not entirely clear. In 
the model, more participation in plan development leads to higher participation rates, 
perhaps via the effect that employees are more willing to participate in plans they 
have helped to create. However, a plausible alternative scenario is that managers 
decide that the scheme covers the entire workforce, and when this decision is made, 
the managers allow (or encourage) employees to participate in plan development.  
There may be a French effect at work: employee participation in development is 
substantially higher on average in France, and this may reflect the requirement for 
explicit employee consent to profit sharing plans in French legislation. 
 
In column 2 (Table 8) the results for equity scheme participation are shown. 
As could be expected, several of the country dummies are significant. Also the 
industry dummy ICT is significant and large at 27 per cent, indicating that ICT firms 
typically operate inclusive schemes. A log-unit increase in the number of employees 
decreases the participation rate by 2.5 per cent. Interestingly, the second participation 
component is negative and significant, while the first component is insignificant. 
Although participation in general appears to be unrelated to the participation rates in 
equity schemes, there is evidence that representative participation inhibits the 
participation in equity. This is consistent with hypothesis that employees may oppose 
equity schemes when they have a say, perhaps due to the risk involved in them.  It 
also suggests that employee participation is not dependent on the provision of voice 
mechanisms to protect their investments.     
 
Column 6 adds the further variables. The significant negative coefficients on 
the country dummies in Column 2 become insignificant (though France becomes 
significantly positive at 10 per cent) but the employee tax relief variable is positive at 
10 per cent. Some of the country effects are likely to be channelled into the tax effect. 
The performance effect is negative (though insignificant) suggesting that employees 
are sound investors.  Most important for our purposes, the measure for employee 
participation in plan management is not significant, suggesting that this form of 
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protection is not critical for high employee participation or for highly inclusive equity 
plans.  Furthermore, indirect participation continues to be negative and significant. 
 
Columns 3 and 4, and then 7 and 8, examine the determinants of high 
participation rates in specific types of equity plan. Country dummies are significant 
for the restricted specification for share acquisition plans though some of these 
become insignificant when employee tax reliefs are added in Column 7.  Participation 
in profit sharing plan has similar effects in the two specifications, and this result 
suggests that the UK Approved Profit Sharing plan is being picked-up here.  
Employee participation in all forms is insignificant in both specification 3 and 7.   
 
The stock option results (Columns 4 and 8) are somewhat different from the 
stock acquisition plan results.  Country effects are less pronounced in the restricted 
specification and are insignificant in the full specification.  The ICT dummy is most 
powerful in both equations and there are also significant negative size effects.  
Employee participation is not apparently dependent on tax concessions.  The most 
important result for our purposes is that all forms of participation are negatively 
related to employee participation in stock options, with the contrast between indirect 
and direct participation being significant in both specifications.  These results suggest 
that stock options in particular do not form part of a participative work culture.  We 
may speculate that broad-based stock options are used for rather different purposes 
than employee involvement, such as providing rewards where there are liquidity 
constraints on the firm.        
 
 
5 Conclusions 
  
In this paper, we have used data from listed firms in six EU countries to investigate 
the relationship between several types of financial participation and various other 
forms of employee participation.  Overall, our expectation was that these other forms 
of participation would form complementary relationships with financial participation, 
as the literature tends to predict.  The most important result generated by the study is 
that there are substantial differences between types of financial participation in this 
respect.  Whereas profit sharing is accompanied by other forms of participation, 
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including indirect participation and employee involvement in plan management, 
companies with equity-based plans tend to be less participative in every respect.  This 
is particularly pronounced in the case of stock option plans.   
 
 We can think of three possible explanations for the profit sharing results.  The 
first is that country-specific participation effects are embedded in the results. The high 
incidence of profit sharing in France, coupled with high levels of indirect participation 
relative to direct participation, may be partly responsible. The finding that employee 
involvement in plan development has significantly positive effects on employee 
participation rates may reflect the requirements in French profit sharing legislation 
that plans have to be agreed by employees or their representatives.  This explanation 
has some credence though it should be borne in mind that French companies have 
very low incidence, compared to companies in the other countries, of direct 
participation, and we would expect to find this reflected in the overall results for 
participation if a French effect is at work.  
 
A second, more general, explanation is that the high rates of participation in 
profit sharing plans complement other forms of participation with equally wide 
coverage to a much greater extent than share plans, where participation is often much 
lower (because employees typically have to opt-in rather than opting-out).  The 
immediate effects of profit sharing, compared with the deferred character of share-
based rewards, may be more conducive to applying ‘reinforcement’ effects to 
cooperative employee behaviour in other arenas of employee participation.  This 
explanation has some force but it should be borne in mind that we in effect control for 
levels of employee participation in financial participation plans, and that the negative 
results for other forms of employee participation apply to equity plans where 
participation rates are high. 
 
A third, general explanation is that profit sharing is more complementary to 
indirect representation than equity based plans because it has much closer linkages to 
core employee remuneration.  Profit shares, except when paid in shares, are paid from 
the wages budget and provide cash supplements to wages or cash contributions to 
saving plans.  Since employee wages are typically subject to collective bargaining in 
many large European firms, profit sharing seems likely to come into the ambit of 
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collective bargaining, even where it is designed to bring about greater flexibility in 
pay and pay determination. Even where profit sharing is not formally subject to 
collective bargaining, it may be stipulated as an issue for works councils, as in 
Germany.  By contrast, equity plans in most cases are formally distinct from wages 
and are governed separately by securities regulations. We would not expect therefore 
the same degree of complementarity with indirect participation.  Ironically, the main 
exception to this is stock option plans where in young, liquidity-constrained ICT 
firms, options have functioned as pay substitutes.  The nature of these firms is that 
they tend not to possess institutions of employee representation for a variety of 
reasons.         
 Nevertheless, the lack of a strong or clear relationship between direct (usually 
employer-initiated) participation and equity plans remains something of a puzzle 
given existing theory.  We expect plans to be more prevalent, and employees more 
likely to participate in them, where there are other forms of employee involvement.  
These results suggest that equity plans operate to a different logic.  One may be the 
availability of tax breaks: firms use equity plans to make tax breaks available to 
workers. These tax breaks may provide a sufficient degree of risk premium or 
insurance to generate high employee participation even in the absence of institutions 
to protect their investments.  Unfortunately, we are not able to investigate such 
possibilities further as we lack both employee data and information on company 
characteristics other than the participation arrangements.  Future research needs to add 
this kind of data to further our understanding of the relationship between financial 
participation and other forms of employee participation.             
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Table 1 Number of respondents in each country 
 
 
Country Initial sample Number of 
responses 
 
Response rate  
 
(%) 
Respondents 
as 
percentage 
of all 
responses 
Netherlands 180 70  
 
38.9 27.3 
France 114 30 
 
26.3 11.7 
UK 169 56 
 
33.1 21.9 
Finland 145 42 
 
29.0 16.4 
Spain 94 17 
 
18.1 6.6 
Germany 167 41 
 
24.6 16 
Total 869 256 29.5 100 
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Table 2  Incidence of profit-sharing, options or share ownership by country  
 
  Percentages of firms (except where shown) 
 
 Netherlands France UK Finland Spain Germany Total 
Profit-
sharing (all 
forms) 
47.1 83.3 51.8 57.1 11.8 48.8 52.0 
Broad-
based 
profit-
sharing  
38.6 83.3 50.0 50.0 5.9 41.5 46.5 
Share 
schemes 
(all forms) 
64.3 63.3 89.3 57.1 41.2 80.5 68.5 
Stock 
options 
60.0 56.7 78.6 54.8 35.3 61.0 61.3 
Broad 
based share 
schemes 
(including 
options) 
37.1 46.7 64.3 35.7 11.8 48.8 44.1 
Proportion 
of firms 
with at 
least one 
scheme 
82.9 90.0 94.6 85.7 41.2 92.7 85.5 
Proportion 
of firms 
with a 
broad-
based 
scheme 
57.1 80.0 66.1 66.7 11.8 56.1 60.2 
Average 
number of 
schemes 
1.31 2.03 2.16 1.48 0.65 1.59 1.61 
Percentage 
of broad-
based 
schemes of 
all schemes 
76.9 88.9 69.8 77.8 28.6 60.5 70.3 
 
Notes: 1) One firm may have multiple schemes. 2) The respondent is classified having 
a broad-based scheme if it has at least one scheme where at least 50 % of its 
employees participate. 
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Table 3  Age of financial participation plans  
 
Means, (standard deviation), median, and (number of observations) 
 
 Netherlands France UK Finland Spain Germany All 
Age, 
profit 
sharing 
schemes 
15.84 
(9.61) 
12 
(31) 
19.13 
(11.84) 
16 
(23) 
11.41 
(8.17) 
15 
(22) 
5.71 
(3.55) 
5 
(21) 
5 
(.) 
5 
(1) 
20.21 
(24.51) 
10 
(19) 
14.45 
(13.59) 
11 
(117) 
Age, 
share 
schemes 
4.56 
(3.50) 
4 
(9) 
22.80 
(16.36) 
21 
(10) 
8.21 
(8.86) 
6.5 
(28) 
2.78 
(1.86) 
2 
(9) 
4.50 
(3.53) 
4.50 
(2) 
8.60 
(11.28) 
3 
(20) 
9.04 
(11.15) 
5 
(78) 
Age, 
stock 
option 
schemes 
6.33 
(5.09) 
4 
(39) 
9.80 
(10.35) 
6 
(5) 
10.34 
(7.77) 
9 
(35) 
2.18 
(1.47) 
2 
(22) 
3.40 
(4.28) 
2 
(5) 
1.48 
(0.82) 
2 
(25) 
5.80 
(6.32) 
3 
(131) 
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Table 4  Means (standard deviations) and Pearson correlation coefficients  
between the participation variables  
 
Variable Means 
(s.d.) 
Trade 
union 
Works 
council 
or other
Board  Employee 
survey 
Suggesti
on 
scheme 
Quality 
circle 
Team-
work 
Trade union 
committee 
0.39 
(0.49) 
1.00       
Works 
council or 
similar 
committee 
0.76 
(0.43) 
0.23*** 1.00      
Board 
representati
on 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.16*** 0.22**
* 
1.00     
Employee 
survey 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.12* -0.01 0.21*** 1.00    
Suggestion 
scheme 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.18*** 0.05 0.24*** 0.26*** 1.00   
Quality 
circle 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.19*** 0.12* 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.49*** 1.00  
Teamwork 0.30 
(0.46) 
-0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.15** 0.26*** 0.28*** 1.00 
 
Significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%. 
 
N = 245 
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Table 5: Principal components of the participation variables: Eigenvectors 
 
Variable Eigenvector 
1 
Eigenvector 
2 
Eigenvector 
3 
Eigenvector 
4 
Eigenvector 
5 
Eigenvector 
6 
Eigenvector 
7 
Trade union 0.291 0.440 0.220 -0.735 -0.008 0.364 -0.022 
Works 
council or 
other 
representation 
0.188 0.626 0.327 0.335 0.406 -0.412 0.137 
Board 
representation 
0.372 0.310 -0.425 0.491 -0.124 0.573 -0.024 
Employee 
survey 
0.372 -0.167 -0.630 -0.278 0.537 -0.261 0.063 
Suggestion 
scheme 
0.499 -0.184 0.102 -0.006 -0.470 -0.220 0.661 
Quality circle 0.521 -0.127 0.146 0.053 -0.258 -0.294 -0.731 
Teamwork 0.288 -0.490 0.486 0.161 0.493 0.410 0.060 
Eigenvalue 2.160 1.278 0.884 0.818 0.718 0.639 0.503 
Proportion 
explained 
(cumulative) 
0.309 0.491 0.617 0.734 0.837 0.928 1.00 
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Table 6  The probability of a broad-based financial participation scheme.  
 
Probit marginal effects (z-values in parenthesis).   
 
 Broad-based 
profit-sharing 
scheme 
Broad-based 
equity scheme 
Broad-
based share 
acquisition 
plan 
Share 
options 
plans 
Broad-based equity 
scheme / broad-
based profit-sharing 
scheme 
0.118* 
(1.34) 
0.125* 
(1.77) 
0.212** 
(2.41) 
0.124 
(1.52) 
General 
participation 
0.054** 
(1.97) 
-0.016 
(-0.56) 
0.019 
(0.56) 
-0.024 
(-0.76) 
Contrast between 
indirect 
participation and 
direct participation 
0.054 
(1.52) 
-0.041 
(-1.19) 
-0.010 
(-0.23) 
-0.033 
(-0.89) 
Netherlands 0.065 
(0.63) 
-0.355*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.471*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.325*** 
(-3.37) 
France 0.550*** 
(4.93) 
-0.207 
(-1.54) 
-0.282** 
(-2.21) 
-0.152 
(-1.08) 
Finland 0.171 
(1.31) 
-0.434*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.477*** 
(-4.82) 
-0.359*** 
(-3.40) 
Spain -0.299*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.513*** 
(-4.47) 
-0.457*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.462*** 
(-4.36) 
Germany -0.103 
(-0.94) 
-0.118 
(-1.00) 
-0.343*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.196* 
(-1.67) 
UK (omitted)     
ICT -0.041 
(-0.42) 
0.201** 
(2.38) 
0.123 
(1.03) 
0.285*** 
(3.16) 
Services -0.034 
(-0.44) 
-0.009 
(-0.12) 
0.049 
(0.51) 
-0.033 
(-0.39) 
Manufacturing 
(omitted) 
    
Nr of employees (in 
log) 
0.055*** 
(2.83) 
-0.048*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.037 
(-1.55) 
-0.051** 
(-2.45) 
Nr of observations 222 222 222 222 
Likelihood ratio 
chi2 
58.64*** 38.65*** 59.37*** 39.27*** 
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.121 0.237 0.137 
Expected 
probability  
0.350 0.611 0.506 0.502 
 
Significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%. The expected probability was 
calculated by keeping the log of nr of employees at its mean and other variables at 
zero.  
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Table 7  Employee participation rates in financial participation by country 
 
Mean, (standard deviation),and median percentages. Number of 
observations 
 
   
 
 Netherlands France UK Finland Spain Germany All 
Participation 
rate, Profit-
sharing 
N 
77.16 
(34.90) 
98 
(31) 
98.41 
(4.73) 
100  
(22) 
78.38 
(24.33) 
85 
(24) 
80.96 
(26.77) 
97.50 
(24) 
55 
(63.64) 
55 
(2) 
76.44 
(35.00) 
100 
(18) 
81.55 
(29.01) 
100 
(121) 
Participation 
rate, Equity  
plan 
N 
51.07 
(37.51) 
50 
(42) 
73.87 
(27.71) 
75 
(18) 
57.10 
(30.04) 
55 
(43) 
53.05 
(33.12) 
50 
(19) 
29.80 
(31.63) 
20 
(5) 
52.26 
(32.26) 
50 
(27) 
55.18 
(33.35) 
56.00 
(154) 
Participation 
rate, stock 
options 
N 
50.51 
(37.90) 
50 
(39) 
72.45 
(27.88) 
70 
(17) 
57.75 
(31.06) 
57.5 
(38) 
52.11 
(33.81) 
45 
(18) 
29.80 
(31.63) 
20 
(5) 
52.67 
(33.18) 
50 
(21) 
54.99 
(33.95) 
56 
(138) 
Participation 
rate, share 
acquisition 
N 
55.73 
(37.37) 
50 
(11) 
75.85 
(27.06) 
80 
(13) 
58.73 
(29.60) 
60 
(41) 
50.00 
(38.59) 
40 
(10) 
41.67 
(37.53) 
20 
(3) 
50.63 
(28.45) 
41.5 
(16) 
57.89 
(31.57) 
58.5 
(94) 
 
 
Notes:  
Where respondents participate in options and share acquisition programmes 
we are unable to distinguish the separate participation rates in each.  
 
Equity plans include stock appreciation rights and convertible bonds 
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Table 8  The determinants of employee participation rates.  
 
OLS estimates (t-values in parenthesis) 
 
 (1) Participation 
rate in PS scheme 
(2) Participation 
rate in equity 
scheme 
(3) Participation 
rate in share 
acquisition scheme
(4) Participation 
rate in stock 
options scheme 
Participation rate 
in equity / profit-
sharing scheme 
0.14 
(1.56) 
0.09 
(1.56) 
0.11** 
(2.17) 
0.11 
(1.78) 
General 
participation 
5.31** 
(2.30) 
-1.52 
(-0.79) 
1.36 
(0.79) 
-1.93 
(-0.99) 
Contrast between 
indirect 
participation and 
direct participation 
2.52 
(0.86) 
-4.48* 
(-1.86) 
-2.04 
(-0.95) 
-4.36* 
(-1.79) 
Netherlands 8.41 
(0.96) 
-25.58*** 
(-3.65) 
-44.52*** 
(-7.13) 
-23.06 
(-3.25) 
France 55.61*** 
(4.76) 
-2.58 
(-0.25) 
-13.34 
(-1.48) 
-1.37 
(-0.13) 
Finland 14.61 
(1.35) 
-34.47*** 
(-4.00) 
-47.12*** 
(-6.14) 
-28.36*** 
(-3.26) 
Spain -26.36** 
(-1.98) 
-38.77*** 
(-3.62) 
-36.64*** 
(-3.85) 
-32.48*** 
(-3.00) 
Germany -5.16 
(-0.51) 
-5.62 
(-0.67) 
-24.12*** 
(-3.25) 
-6.47 
(-0.77) 
UK (omitted)     
ICT -10.00 
(-1.12) 
27.42*** 
(3.88) 
12.28* 
(1.95) 
31.64*** 
(4.43) 
Services 4.36 
(0.67) 
1.01 
(0.19) 
3.98 
(0.84) 
0.91 
(0.17) 
Manufacturing 
(omitted) 
    
Nr of employees 
(in log) 
3.76** 
(2.39) 
-2.50* 
(-1.92) 
-1.39 
(-1.20) 
-2.54* 
(-1.93) 
Constant -0.10 
(-0.01) 
64.53*** 
(4.99) 
54.77*** 
(4.76) 
57.54*** 
(4.43) 
Nr of observations 207 207 207 207 
F-test 6.52*** 5.38*** 7.75*** 5.12*** 
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.190 0.265 0.18 
 
Significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%.  
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Table 9  The determinants of employee participation rates.  
 
OLS estimates (t-values in parenthesis) 
 
 (5) Participation 
rate in PS scheme 
(6) Participation 
rate in equity 
scheme 
(7) Participation in 
stock acquisition 
plan 
(8) Participation in 
stock options plan 
Participation rate 
in equity / profit-
sharing scheme 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.14* 
(1.92) 
0.12* 
(1.72) 
0.19** 
(2.53) 
General 
participation 
4.45 
(1.63) 
-0.56 
(-0.25) 
2.89 
(1.27) 
-2.48 
(-1.03) 
Contrast between 
indirect 
participation and 
direct participation 
1.52 
(0.45) 
-6.43** 
(-2.37) 
-2.35 
(-0.85) 
-5.58* 
(-1.92) 
Netherlands 2.99 
(0.29) 
-8.08 
(-0.96) 
-34.95*** 
(-4.12) 
-13.39 
(-1.49) 
France 36.88*** 
(2.64) 
21.90* 
(1.83) 
11.71 
(0.97) 
20.04 
(1.57) 
Finland 7.57 
(0.59) 
-7.67 
(-0.63) 
-24.40** 
(-1.99) 
-7.63 
(-0.59) 
Spain -43.41** 
(-2.14) 
-14.66 
(-0.86) 
-8.39 
(-0.49) 
-12.37 
(-0.68) 
Germany -14.02 
(-1.23) 
0.76 
(0.08) 
-11.37 
(-1.17) 
-3.68 
(-0.36) 
UK (omitted)     
ICT -13.82 
(-1.41) 
18.71** 
(2.45) 
14.99* 
(1.94) 
25.42*** 
(3.11) 
Services 3.52 
(0.46) 
-2.27 
(-0.35) 
4.68 
(0.72) 
-2.72 
(-0.40) 
Manufacturing 
(omitted) 
    
Nr of employees 
(in log) 
3.35* 
(1.85) 
-3.48** 
(-2.36) 
-2.02 
(-1.36) 
-3.88** 
(-2.46) 
Employee 
participation in the 
scheme design 
 (1-5 scale) 
8.97*** 
(2.86) 
1.61 
(0.53) 
0.64 
(0.21) 
-2.69 
(-0.83) 
Performance at 
adoption above 
industry average 
1.11 
(0.16) 
-5.21 
(-0.91) 
-2.44 
(-0.42) 
-4.81 
(-0.78) 
Employee tax 
reliefs 
- 12.29* 
(1.72) 
15.99** 
2.21 
9.00 
(1.18) 
 
Company tax 
reliefs 
- 2.84 
(0.40) 
7.64 
(1.06) 
3.09 
(0.41) 
Constant 3.61 
(0.17) 
64.44*** 
(3.89) 
42.90** 
(2.56) 
71.26*** 
(4.02) 
Nr of observations 158 123 123 123 
F-test 4.50*** 3.07*** 4.95*** 3.11*** 
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.203 0.327 0.260 
 
Significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%.  
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Appendix One  The use of indirect and direct participation: frequency and relative 
frequency (in percentages) 
 
 Netherlands 
(69) 
France 
(29-30) 
UK 
(55) 
Finland 
(41) 
Spain 
(16) 
Germany 
(34) 
All 
(244-5) 
Indirect 
participation 
       
Trade union 
committee 
14 
(20.3%) 
16 
(53.3%)
23 
(41.8%) 
24 
(58.5%)
7 
(43.8%)
11 
(32.4%) 
95 
(38.8%)
Board 
representation 
2 
(2.9%) 
10 
(33.3%)
11 
(20.0%) 
16 
(39.0%)
1 
(6.3%) 
23 
(67.7%) 
63 
(25.7%)
Other form of 
representation 
(incl. works 
councils and 
joint 
consultation 
committees) 
54 
(78.3%) 
26 
(86.7%)
38 
(69.1%) 
25 
(61.0%)
14 
(87.5%)
29 
(85.3%) 
186 
(75.9%)
Average 
number of 
indirect 
participation 
practices 
1.01 
(0.68) 
1.73 
(0.94) 
1.31 
(0.88) 
1.59 
(1.14) 
1.38 
(0.72) 
1.85 
(0.96) 
1.40 
(0.93) 
Number of 
firms having 
at least one 
indirect 
participation 
practice 
54 
(78.3%) 
27 
(90.0%)
44 
(80.0%) 
30 
(73.2%)
15 
(93.7%)
30 
(89.2%) 
200 
(82.6%)
Direct 
participation 
       
Employee 
survey 
18 
(26.1%) 
3 
(10.0%)
32 
(58.2%) 
25 
(63.4%)
2 
(12.5%)
12 
(35.3%) 
93 
(38.0%)
Suggestion 
scheme 
18 
(26.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
26 
(47.3%) 
30 
(73.2%)
9 
(56.3%)
19 
(55.9%) 
102 
(41.6%)
Quality circle 16 
(23.2%) 
1 
(3.3%) 
20 
(36.4%) 
21 
(51.2%)
5 
(31.3%)
15 
(44.1%) 
78 
(31.8%)
Teamwork 25 
(36.2%) 
3 
(10.0%)
13 
(23.6%) 
25 
(61.0%)
1 
(6.3%) 
6 
(17.7%) 
73 
(29.8%)
Average 
number of 
direct 
participation 
practices 
1.12 
(1.24) 
0.23 
(0.63) 
1.65 
(1.19) 
2.49 
(1.16) 
1.06 
(0.85) 
1.53 
(1.28) 
1.41 
(1.30) 
Number of 
firms having 
at least one 
direct 
participation 
practice 
40 
(58.0%) 
5 
(16.7%)
46 
(83.6%) 
38 
(92.7%)
11 
(68.8%)
24 
(70.6%) 
164 
(67.0%)
 34
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Addison, J. and C. Belfield  (2000). ‘The impact of financial participation and 
employee involvement on financial performance: A re-estimation using the 1998 
WERS’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 47: 571-583. 
 
Ben-Ner, A. and D.Jones (1995) ‘Employee Participation, Ownership and 
Productivity: A Theoretical Framework’, Industrial Relations, 34: 532-555. 
 
Ben-Ner, A., W. A. Burns, G.Dow, and L.Putterman (2000) ’Employee Ownership: 
An Empirical Exploration’, pp. 194-240 in M. Blair and T. Kochan (eds.): The New 
Relationship: Human Capital in the American Corporation, Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings. 
 
Blinder, A. (1990) Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, Washington 
D.C.: Brookings. 
 
Breen, R.(1996) Regression Models: Censored, Sample Selected, and Truncated 
Data, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Nr 111,Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
 
Buschak, W. (2002) ‘Financial participation for employees in the European Union – a 
pragmatic view’ Transfer 8 (1): 76-82. 
 
Carstensen, V., G.Gerlach, and O.Hubler (1995) ‘Profit sharing in German firms’, in 
F.buttler, W.Franz, R. Schettkat, and D. Soskice (eds.) Institutional Frameworks and 
Labor Market Performance: Comparative Views on the US and German Economies. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2002) Communication from the 
Commission to the council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: on a Framework for the Promotion of 
Employee Financial Participation.  Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities, COM (2002) 364 final. 
 
Doucouliagos, C. (1995) ‘Worker Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed 
and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A Meta-Analysis’, Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 49 (1): 58-77. 
 
Drago, R. and J. Heywood (1995) ‘The choice of payment schemes: Australian 
establishment data’,  Industrial Relations, 34: 507-531. 
 
Dube, A.and R. Freeman (2001) ‘Shared Compensation Systems and Decision-
Making in the US Job Market’, in Incomes and Productivity in North America: 
Papers from the 2000 Seminar, Washington, DC: Commission for Labor Cooperation.  
 
 35
Dunteman, G. (1989) Principal Components Analysis, Quantitative Applications in 
the Social Sciences Nr 69,Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Eaton, A. and P. Voos. (1992). ‘Unions and contemporary innovations in work 
organisation, compensation, and employee participation’ in L.Mishel and P.Voos 
(eds.) Unions and Economic Competitiveness.  
 
Fernie, S. and D. Metcalf (1995) ‘Participation, Contingent Pay, Representation and 
Workplace Performance: Evidence from Great Britain’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 33 (3): 379-415. 
 
Festing, M., Y. Groening, R. Pabst, and W. Weber (1999) ‘Financial participation in 
Europe – determinants and outcomes’ Economic and Industrial Democracy 20: 295-
329. 
 
Greene, W. (2000) Econometric Analysis, New York: Macmillan (4th ed.). 
 
Gregg, P.and S. Machin (1988) ‘Unions and the incidence of performance linked pay 
schemes in Britain’ International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 6 (1): 91-109.  
 
Heywood, J., O. Hubler, and U. Jirjahn (1997) ‘Use of variable payment schemes: 
evidence from Germany’, Kyklos, 51(2): 237-58. 
  
Huselid, M. (1995) ‘The impact of human resourcemanagement practices on turnover, 
producitivyt, and corporate financial performance’ Academy of Management Journal 
38 (3): 635-672. 
 
Ichniowski, C., K. Shaw, and G. Prennushi (1997) ‘The effects of Human Resource 
Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines’, American 
Economic Review, 87 (3): 291-322. 
 
Ittner, C., R. Lambert, and D. Larcker (2003) ‘The Structure and Performance of 
Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms’, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 34, (1-3), 89-127. 
 
Jones, D., P. Kalmi and M. Mäkinen (2004) ‘The Incidence of Broad-Based and 
Selective Stock Option Schemes: Evidence From Finland’, paper presented in the 
ASSA meetings, San Diego, January 2004. 
 
Jones, D. and T. Kato (1995) ‘The Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-
Ownership Plans and Bonuses: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data’, American 
Economic Review, 85 (3): 391-414. 
  
Jones, D., T. Kato and J. Pliskin (1997) ‘Profit Sharing and Gainsharing: A Review of 
Theory, Incidence, and Effects’, in D. Lewin, D. Mitchell, and M. Zaidi (eds.) The 
Human Resource Management Handbook, part I, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
 
Kandel, E. and E. Lazear (1992) ‘Peer Pressure in Partnerships’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 100: 801-17. 
 
 36
Kruse, D.  (1996). ‘Why do firms adopt profit-sharing and employee ownership 
plans? British Journal of Industrial Relations’, 34: 515-538. 
 
Kruse, D. and J. Blasi (1997) ‘Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes, and Firm 
Performance: A Review of the Evidence’, in D. Lewin, D. Mitchell, and M. Zaidi 
(eds.) The Human Resource Management Handbook, part I, Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press. 
 
Laursen, K. and N. Foss (2003) ‘New Human Resource Management Practices, 
Complementarities and the Impact on Innovation Performance’, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 27 (2): 243-63. 
 
Levine, D. (1995) Reinventing the Workplace: How Business and Employees Can 
Both Win, Washington, D.C.: Brookings. 
 
Levine, D. and L.D’Andrea Tyson (1990) ‘Participation, productivity, and the firm’s 
environment’ in A.Blinder (ed.) Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, 
Washington D.C.: Brookings. 
 
MacDuffie, J. (1995) ‘Human Resource Bundles and Manufacturing Performance: 
Organizational Logic and Flexible Production Systems in the World Auto Industry’, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48:197-221. 
 
McNabb, R. and K. Whitfield  (1998). ‘The impact of financial participation and 
employee involvement on financial performance’. Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 45: 171-187. 
 
Oyer, P. (20020 ‘Why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects?’ 
Stanford University: unpublished mimeo. 
 
Pendleton, A. (1997) ‘Characteristics of workplaces with financial participation: 
evidence from the WIRS’ Industrial Relations Journal, 28: 103-119. 
 
Pendleton, A., Poutsma, E., Ommeren, J. van and Brewster, C. (2001). Employee 
share ownership and profit sharing in the European Union. Dublin: European 
Foundation. 
 
Pendleton, A., Poutsma, E., Ommeren, J. van and Brewster, C. (2003). ‘The Incidence 
and Determinants of Employee Share Ownership and Profit Sharing in Europe’ in T. 
Kato and J. Pliskin, (eds.), The Determinants of the Incidence and Effects of 
Participatory Organisations. (Advances of the Economic Analysis of Participatory 
and Labor Management, Volume 7). Oxford: Elseviers Science ltd.. 
 
Pérotin, V. and A. Robinson (2003) Employee Participation of Profit and Ownership: 
A Review of Issues and Evidence, Luxembourg: European Parliament. 
 
Poutsma, E. (2001): Recent Trends in Employee Financial Participation in the 
European Union, Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions. 
 
 37
Poutsma, E. and W. deNijs  (2003). ‚Broad-based employee financial participation in 
the European Union’. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 14: 
863-892. 
 
Poutsma, E. and F. Huijgen (1999). ‚European diversity in the use of participation 
schemes.’ Economic and Industrial Democracy, 20: 197-223. 
 
Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations (UNICE) (2002) Financial 
Participation of Employees in the European Union: UNICE Position.  Brussels: 
UNICE. 
 
Weitzman, M. and D. Kruse (1990) ‘Profit-Sharing and Productivity’, in A. Blinder 
(ed.) Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, Washington D.C.: Brookings. 
 
                                                 
i See for instance the recent European commission (2002) communication. Prior to that, EU has 
published e.g. two PEPPER reports and Community Recommendation in 1991. 
ii Given that information was being collected at corporate level from large, often diversified, 
companies, we also expected that such a measure would be unreliable. 
iii Kurtosis and skewness statistics indicate that the distribution is clustered with a long right hand tail  
iv The co-incidence of profit-sharing schemes and equity schemes may also be caused by different pay 
systems for different occupational groups, e.g. stock options for managers and profit-sharing for the 
entire personnel. However, we can control this to some extent, since we have information on 
participation rates.  
v Alternatively, we could have used the bivariate probit model, where the probabilities for these two 
outcomes are estimated simultaneously by assuming that the disturbance terms in these equations are 
correlated (see Greene 2000, 849-56). The results from the bivariate probit models turned out to be 
similar to univariate probit models. Since the coefficients are easier to interpret in the univariate model, 
we report those in the paper. The bivariate results are available upon request.  
vi The marginal effects of dummy variables are easier to interpret, when they are evaluated at zero 
(rather than at sample means). The participation indices are continuous, but they are standardised to 
have mean zero and standard deviation of one. 
vii We have also checked the results by using the summated participation indices from Table 5 as 
explanatory variables. Overall, the results are quite consistent with the principal components approach.  
viii The sample mean of this variable is 7.59 and standard deviation 2.28. 
ix It is widely suggested that correlations between financial participation and superior company 
performance reflect a reverse causality to that stipulated in studies of performance effects (e.g. 
Weitzman and Kruse, 1990) 
x An alternative would be use models for censored or sample-selected data, such as tobit models or 
Heckman-type selection models (see e.g. Breen, 1996). However, these approaches are also sensitive to 
statistical problems. Probably due to the fact that most observations in profit-sharing equation are 
concentrated to the ends of the distribution, the standard two-limit tobit model produces implausibly 
large coefficients. In turn, Heckman-type selection models are quite sensitive to the assumption that the 
selection process is correctly specified. This assumption is not easily met with our data, which involves 
selection in two margins. Furthermore, our dependent variable is not censored in the sense that the 
values of dependent variable would not be observed for some observations, rather there are natural 
boundaries for these values. Partly for the ease of interpreting the OLS coefficients and partly for the 
lack of obvious solutions to the statistical problem, we go on to use the OLS, but remind the reader to 
be careful in interpreting the coefficients.    
